The Supreme Court Law
Review: Osgoode’s Annual
Constitutional Cases
Conference
Volume 54 (2011)

Article 20

Equal Autonomy in Canadian Federalism: The
Continuing Search for Balance in the Interpretation
of the Division of Powers
Bruce Ryder
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, bryder@osgoode.yorku.ca

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
Citation Information
Ryder, Bruce. "Equal Autonomy in Canadian Federalism: The Continuing Search for Balance in the Interpretation of the Division of
Powers." The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference 54. (2011).
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol54/iss1/20

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Supreme
Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.

Equal Autonomy in Canadian
Federalism: The Continuing Search
for Balance in the Interpretation of
the Division of Powers
Bruce Ryder∗
I. INTRODUCTION
During most of the past decade, the justices of the Supreme Court of
Canada have achieved and maintained a remarkable degree of consensus
around their approach to the interpretation of the division of legislative
powers in the Constitution Act, 1867.1 Since Beverley McLachlin’s
appointment as Chief Justice in January 2000, the Court has been
unanimous in its disposition of division of powers issues in 25 rulings or
reference opinions.2 The Court was divided on the disposition of a
division of powers issue in only one case between 2000 and 2008.3
∗
Associate Professor and Assistant Dean First Year, Osgoode Hall Law School, York
University. I would like to thank my colleague Jamie Cameron for her thoughtful and helpful
comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I would also like to thank Ali Mirsky, J.D. Candidate,
Osgoode Hall Law School, Class of 2013, for her excellent editorial and research assistance.
1
(U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5.
2
The 25 rulings or opinions, in chronological order, are: Global Securities Corp. v. British
Columbia (Securities Commission), [2000] S.C.J. No. 5, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 494 (S.C.C.) (9-0 ruling,
per Iacobucci J., upholding challenged provision of the Securities Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 418);
Reference re Firearms Act (Can.), [2000] S.C.J. No. 31, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 783 (S.C.C.) (9-0 ruling,
issued by “the Court”, upholding the Firearms Act, S.C. 2005, c. 39, as a valid exercise of
Parliament’s criminal law power); Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] S.C.J. No. 36, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950
(S.C.C.) (7-0 ruling, per Iacobucci J., finding provincial casino program did not encroach on federal
jurisdiction in relation to Aboriginal people); Law Society of British Columbia v. Mangat, [2001]
S.C.J. No. 66, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 113 (S.C.C.) (9-0 ruling, per Gonthier J., finding provisions of
Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2, paramount over conflicting provisions of B.C. Legal
Profession Act, S.B.C. 1987, c. 25); Ward v. Canada (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 21,
[2002] 1 S.C.R. 569 (S.C.C.) (9-0 ruling, per McLachlin C.J.C., finding challenged provision of
Marine Mammal Regulations, SOR/93-56, to be a valid exercise of Parliament’s fisheries power);
Kitkatla Band v. British Columbia (Minister of Small Business, Tourism and Culture), [2002] S.C.J.
No. 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 146 (S.C.C.) (7-0 ruling, per LeBel J., upholding challenged provisions of
B.C. Heritage Conservation Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 187); Krieger v. Law Society of Alberta, [2002]
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S.C.J. No. 45, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 372 (S.C.C.) (9-0 ruling, per Iacobucci and Major JJ., upholding the
application to Crown prosecutor of Code of Professional Conduct passed pursuant to Alberta’s Legal
Profession Act, S.A. 1990, c. L-9.1); Siemens v. Manitoba (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 69,
[2003] 1 S.C.R. 6 (S.C.C.) (9-0 ruling, per Major J., upholding the validity of the Manitoba statute
regulating video lottery terminals); Paul v. British Columbia (Forest Appeals Commission), [2003]
S.C.J. No. 34, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 585 (S.C.C.) (9-0 ruling, per Bastarache J., finding that the provincial
legislature has jurisdiction to endow administrative tribunals with the power to consider Aboriginal
rights); R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571 (S.C.C.) (9-0
ruling finding prohibitions on marijuana to be a valid exercise of federal jurisdiction; Gonthier and
Binnie JJ. wrote the principal opinion for 6; Arbour J., Deschamps J. and LeBel J. agreed in their
opinions dissenting on Charter grounds); Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] S.C.J. No. 75,
[2004] 3 S.C.R. 698 (S.C.C.) (9-0 opinion, issued by “the Court”, affirming that the proposed Civil
Law Harmonization Act, S.C. 2001, c. 4, would be within Parliament’s jurisdiction to enact laws in
relation to marriage); UL Canada Inc. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 11, [2005] 1
S.C.R. 143 (S.C.C.) (7-0 ruling, per LeBel J., finding the Quebec regulation respecting the colour of
margarine to be a valid exercise of provincial jurisdiction in relation to local trade); Rothmans,
Benson & Hedges Inc. v. Saskatchewan, [2005] S.C.J. No. 1, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 188 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Rothmans”] (9-0 ruling, per Major J., upholding the operation of provincial law
regulating retail displays of tobacco products); Fédération des producteurs de volailles du Québec v.
Pelland, [2005] S.C.J. No. 19, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 292 (S.C.C.) (7-0 ruling, per Abella J., upholding the
provincial component of the cooperative marketing scheme for chickens); British Columbia v.
Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., [2005] S.C.J. No. 50, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473 (S.C.C.) (9-0 ruling, per
Major J., upholding the B.C. Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, S.B.C. 2000,
c. 30, as a valid exercise of provincial jurisdiction); Reference re Employment Insurance Act (Can.),
ss. 22 and 23, [2005] S.C.J. No. 57, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 669 (S.C.C.) (7-0 ruling, per Deschamps J.,
upholding maternity and parental leave provisions of the Employment Insurance Act, S.C. 1996,
c. 23); Kirkbi AG v. Ritvik Holdings Inc., [2005] S.C.J. No. 66, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 302 (S.C.C.) (9-0
ruling, per LeBel J., upholding passing off civil action in federal Trade-marks Act, R.S.C. 1985,
c. T-13, as a valid exercise of Parliament’s trade and commerce power); Isen v. Simms, [2006] S.C.J.
No. 41, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 349 (S.C.C.) (9-0 ruling, per Rothstein J., finding that provincial law applies
to negligence action involving a boat in a parking lot); Dunne v. Quebec (Deputy Minister of
Revenue), [2007] S.C.J. No. 19, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 853 (S.C.C.) (9-0 ruling, per LeBel J., upholding
the validity of Quebec law taxing partnership retirement benefits of non-residents); Canadian
Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 22, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Canadian
Western Bank”] (7-0 ruling, per Binnie and LeBel JJ. for 6, finding Alberta’s Insurance Act, R.S.A.
2000, c. I-3, applied to delivery of insurance services by banks; Bastarache J. wrote a separate
concurring opinion); British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Lafarge Canada Inc., [2007] S.C.J. No.
23, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 86 (S.C.C.) (7-0 ruling finding a Vancouver by-law inoperative (per Binnie and
LeBel JJ. for 6), or inapplicable (in Bastarache J.’s lone concurring opinion), to a cement mixing
facility on port lands); Confédération des syndicats nationaux v. Canada (Attorney General), [2008]
S.C.J. No. 69, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 511 (S.C.C.) (7-0 ruling, per LeBel J., finding the challenged
provisions of the Employment Insurance Act, S.C. 1996, c. 23, to be within Parliament’s jurisdiction
pursuant to s. 91(2A)); Chatterjee v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2009] S.C.J. No. 19, [2009] 1
S.C.R. 624 (S.C.C.) (7-0 ruling, per Binnie J., upholding Ontario’s civil forfeiture statute as a valid
exercise of provincial jurisdiction pursuant to s. 92(13)); NIL/TU,O Child and Family Services
Society v. B.C. Government and Service Employees’ Union, [2010] S.C.J. No. 45, [2010] 2 S.C.R.
696 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “NIL/TU,O”] (9-0 ruling, per Abella J. for 6, finding the agency subject to
provincial labour relations jurisdiction; McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J. wrote a separate concurring
opinion); Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada v. Native Child and Family
Services of Toronto, [2010] S.C.J. No. 46, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 737 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Native Child”]
(9-0 ruling, per Abella J. for 6, finding an Aboriginal child welfare agency subject to provincial
labour relations jurisdiction; McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J. wrote a separate concurring opinion).
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The judges on the McLachlin Court have been united around a commitment to a modern, flexible vision of federalism that generously
interprets both federal and provincial heads of legislative power. The
Court tends to give the pith and substance, double aspect, ancillary
powers and living tree doctrines liberal rein, thus promoting a great deal
of overlap and interplay between federal and provincial laws in growing
areas of de facto concurrent jurisdiction.4 In Abella J.’s words: “[t]oday’s
constitutional landscape is painted with the brush of co-operative
federalism … A co-operative approach accepts the inevitability of
overlap between the exercise of federal and provincial competencies”.5
Indeed, the Court has accorded legislators so much constitutional
breathing space that, by 2010, it was becoming hard to remember the last
time the Court ruled a law ultra vires on the grounds that it was in pith
and substance in relation to the other level of government’s powers
pursuant to sections 91 or 92.6

3
R. v. Demers, [2004] S.C.J. No. 43, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 489 (S.C.C.) (8-1 ruling, per Bastarache and Iacobucci JJ. for the majority, finding the challenged provisions of the Criminal Code,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, to be within Parliament’s jurisdiction pursuant to s. 91(27); LeBel J. was alone
in finding the provisions ultra vires on division of powers grounds). The Court also divided in R. v.
Morris, [2006] S.C.J. No. 59, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 915 (S.C.C.) (4-3 ruling, per Deschamps and Abella
JJ. for the majority, finding that a provision of the B.C. Wildlife Act, S.B.C. 1982, c. 57, prohibiting
hunting at night could not apply to the exercise of treaty rights by the accused hunters; McLachlin
C.J.C. and Fish J. wrote the dissenting opinion). However, the different results reached by the
majority and the dissent in Morris were a product of their different interpretations of the scope of the
Aboriginal treaty right at issue, rather than differing approaches to the interpretation of the limits
placed on provincial power by the division of legislative powers in the Constitution Act, 1867.
4
This approach was comprehensively described and defended in the joint opinion of Binnie and LeBel JJ. in Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 2, at paras. 21-47. For a pre-Canadian
Western Bank overview of these tendencies in the Court’s jurisprudence, see Bruce Ryder, “The End
of Umpire? Federalism and Judicial Restraint” [hereinafter “Ryder”] in J. Cameron, P. Monahan &
B. Ryder, eds. (2006) 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 345, esp. at 350-52.
5
NIL/TU,O, supra, note 2, at para. 42.
6
Some of us are old enough to remember. Before 2010, the last time a provincial or municipal law was declared invalid on division of powers grounds was in 1993, when Nova Scotia
abortion regulations were found to be an invasion of the federal criminal law power: R. v.
Morgentaler, [1993] S.C.J. No. 95, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 463 (S.C.C.). As for federal statutes, apart from
an inconsequential declaratory provision of the proposed Civil Marriage Act that the Court said
would be ultra vires in Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, supra, note 2, one has to go back to the
early 1980s to find the Court declaring a federal statute ultra vires on division of powers grounds.
See Reference re Proposed Federal Tax on exported Natural Gas, [1982] S.C.J. No. 52, [1982] 1
S.C.R. 1004 (S.C.C.) (part of a proposed federal Bill ultra vires); Peel (Regional Municipality) v.
Mackenzie, [1982] S.C.J. No. 58, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 9 (S.C.C.) (severing an invalid portion of the
Criminal Code provision). If it helps to situate these rulings in the mists of time, the week Mackenzie
was released, the song “Tainted Love” by Soft Cell was climbing the North American pop charts.
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Because the Court was not striking down legislation on division of
powers grounds, and because its rulings were almost always unanimous,
the individual members of the McLachlin Court have had limited
opportunities to stamp their distinct judicial personalities on federalism
jurisprudence in the past decade. The epic constitutional battles of the
past, featuring, for example, sharp divisions between six anglophone
judges and three francophone judges from Quebec,7 or clashes between a
strong centralist like Chief Justice Bora Laskin and a strong provincial
autonomist like Justice Jean Beetz,8 seemed, well, a thing of the past.
Some of us were lulled into imagining that the extended period of
jurisprudential quiescence on the federalism front that prevailed on both
sides of the turn of this century might endure. How wrong we were.
The curtain started to be pulled back on the current Supreme Court
justices’ differences on issues of provincial versus national power in the
Court’s 2009 ruling in Consolidated Fastfrate Inc. v. Western Canada
Council of Teamsters.9 Out of the Court’s engagement with a prosaic
issue — which level of government had jurisdiction over labour relations
at a freight forwarding company — emerged profoundly contrasting
views.
Justice Rothstein, writing for a majority of six judges in Fastfrate,
emphasized that the power-conferring provisions in sections 91 to 95 of
the Constitution Act, 1867 are “the bedrock of our federal system. They
seek to preserve local diversity within the federal nation by conferring
‘broad powers’ on provincial legislatures”.10 After undertaking a historical and textual analysis of section 92(10) of the Act, he stated that “the
preference for diversity of regulatory authority over works and undertakings should be respected”11 by treating federal jurisdiction “as the
exception, rather than the rule”.12 He concluded that Fastfrate’s labour
relations fell within provincial jurisdiction because its physical operations did not extend beyond provincial borders, even though the com7

See, e.g., Capital Cities Communications Inc. v. Canadian Radio-Television Commission,
[1977] S.C.J. No. 119, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 141 (S.C.C.); Quebec (Public Service Board) v. Canada
(Attorney General), [1977] S.C.J. No. 120, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 191 (S.C.C.).
8
See, e.g., Reference re Anti-Inflation Act (Canada), [1976] S.C.J. No. 12, [1976] 2 S.C.R.
373 (S.C.C.).
9
[2009] S.C.J. No. 53, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 407 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Fastfrate”].
10
Id., at para. 29.
11
Id., at para. 39.
12
Id., at para. 44. See also para. 68: “a limited genus of works and undertakings should
qualify as federal”.
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pany provided interprovincial services to its customers through contractual arrangements with other carriers.13
In dissent, Binnie J., with the concurrence of the Chief Justice and
Fish J., reached the opposite conclusion starting from a very different
normative premise. In Binnie J.’s view, Fastfrate’s activities and labour
relations should be federally regulated because of the interprovincial
nature of the services it provides. In contrast to Rothstein J.’s emphasis
on the value of provincial diversity in the regulation of presumptively
local works and undertakings, Binnie J.’s starting point was the desirability, from a functional perspective, of a single uniform approach to
regulation of transportation undertakings. “Checkerboard provincial
regulation”, he wrote, “is antithetical to the coherent operation of a single
functionally integrated indivisible national transportation service.”14 He
rued “the sort of ‘originalism’ implicit” in Rothstein J.’s reliance on the
drafting history of the 1867 Act, suggesting instead that constitutional
powers “must now be applied in light of the business realities of 2009
and not frozen in 1867”.15 In a telling aside, he referred to “[t]he persistent feebleness of the federal power over trade and commerce and the
eclipse of the federal authority related to peace, order and good government.”16 This familiar lament echoes that of other frustrated centralists
over the years, like Bora Laskin17 and Frank Scott.18 One could keep
worse company.
The divisions that emerged in the Fastfrate ruling proved to be a
harbinger of things to come. Indeed, in all six federalism rulings released
by the Supreme Court in 2010, the Court divided sharply on fundamental
issues of principle. It was as if once the gloves came off in Fastfrate,
pent up conflicts broke loose. Dissensus quickly emerged in place of the
apparent harmony that had previously prevailed on the Court.

13

Id., at paras. 69-80.
Id., at para. 83.
15
Id., at para. 89.
16
Id.
17
For a summary of Laskin’s views on federalism, see Katherine E. Swinton, The Supreme
Court and Canadian Federalism: The Laskin-Dickson Years (Toronto: Carswell, 1990), esp. c. 8,
“Laskin’s Centralist Vision”, and Philip Girard, Bora Laskin: Bringing Law to Life (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2005), esp. c. 9, “Federalism”.
18
See Frank R. Scott, Essays on the Constitution: Aspects of Canadian Law and Politics
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977).
14
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First, in Quebec (Attorney General) v. Moses,19 the Court split 5-4 on
whether a federal environmental assessment of a mining project was
required in addition to the assessment required under the terms of the
James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement. Justice Binnie, writing for
the majority, found in favour of an additional federal assessment. The
dissent of LeBel and Deschamps JJ. found that only a single provincial
environmental assessment was consistent with the terms of the treaty.
Justice Binnie accused the dissenters of reaching an “anomalous result”20
that substituted “provincial paramountcy” for “cooperative federalism”.21
For their part, the dissenters accused the majority of permitting “the
federal government to unilaterally renege on its own solemn promises” in
“stark contradiction to the honour of the Crown”.22 Gloves off indeed.
Then, in a series of four rulings, two dealing with jurisdiction over
labour relations at agencies providing Aboriginal child and family
services in British Columbia and Ontario respectively,23 and two dealing
with jurisdiction over the location of aerodromes in Quebec,24 the Court
split on the appropriate role of the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine
following the Court’s reconsideration of the doctrine a few years earlier
in Canadian Western Bank.25 Notably, in Lacombe and COPA, the

19

[2010] S.C.J. No. 17, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 557 (S.C.C.).
Id., at para. 3.
Id., at para. 13.
22
Id., at para. 58.
23
NIL/TU,O, supra, note 2 (9-0 ruling; Abella J. for six members of the Court found the
Society subject to provincial labour relations jurisdiction without relying on the interjurisdictional
immunity doctrine; McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J. wrote a separate concurring opinion, joined by
Binnie J., focused on the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine); Native Child, supra, note 2 (9-0
ruling; the opinions of Abella J. and of McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J. each took the same approach as
in NIL/TU,O).
24
Quebec (Attorney General) v. Lacombe, [2010] S.C.J. No. 38, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 453
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lacombe”] (8-1 ruling; McLachlin C.J.C. for seven members of the Court
found the by-law regulating the location of aerodromes invalid, and, even if valid, inapplicable;
LeBel J. in his concurring opinion found the by-law valid and applicable but inoperative by virtue of
the paramountcy doctrine; Deschamps J., dissenting, would have found the by-law valid, applicable
and operative); Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canadian Owners and Pilots Assn., [2010] S.C.J. No.
39, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 536 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “COPA”] (7-2 ruling; McLachlin C.J.C., writing for
the majority, found that Quebec’s Act respecting the preservation of agricultural land and
agricultural activities, R.S.Q., c. P-41.1, had to be read down to prevent an impairment of a core
aspect of exclusive federal jurisdiction in relation to aeronautics; LeBel and Deschamps JJ. wrote
separate dissents finding the Act valid, applicable and operative).
25
Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 2.
20
21
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aerodrome cases, two of the Quebec judges, LeBel and Deschamps JJ.,26
criticized the Chief Justice’s majority opinion for taking an approach that
it is antithetical to co-operative federalism,27 promotes “a more dualistic
or even a more centralized form of federalism”, and “opens the door for
predation upon provincial jurisdiction”.28
Finally, in Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act,29 the
Court split 5-4 on the validity of the challenged provisions of the
Assisted Human Reproduction Act.30 Chief Justice McLachlin, writing
for four members of the Court, found all of the challenged provisions to
be a valid exercise of Parliament’s criminal law power. In their joint
opinion, also for four members of the Court, LeBel and Deschamps JJ.
found all of the challenged provisions to be beyond federal legislative
jurisdiction. Justice Cromwell cast the deciding vote, upholding the
“prohibited activities” provisions of the Act (thus forming a majority
with the Chief Justice in this regard), but finding most of the provisions
regulating “controlled activities” to be beyond the scope of the criminal
law power (thus forming a majority with LeBel and Deschamps JJ. in
this regard).
As in the other recent divided federalism rulings, the mutual recriminations flew in the opinions in the AHRA Reference. The Chief Justice
accused her colleagues of asserting “a new approach of provincial
exclusivity that is supported by neither precedent nor practice”,31 one that
circumscribed the purpose of the criminal law power, which is “to permit
Parliament to create uniform norms”.32 In the view of LeBel and
Deschamps JJ., the Chief Justice’s opinion “goes further than any
previous judicial interpretation” of the criminal law power, essentially
posing no limits and thus jeopardizing “the constitutional balance of the
federal-provincial division of powers”.33

26
Justice LeBel’s separate opinions in Lacombe and COPA each expressly concurred with
Deschamps J.’s approach to the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine. See Lacombe, supra, note 24,
at para. 71; COPA, supra, note 24, at para. 76.
27
Lacombe, id., at para. 116.
28
Id., at para. 184.
29
[2010] S.C.J. No. 61, 2010 SCC 61 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “AHRA Reference”].
30
S.C. 2004, c. 2, ss. 8-19, 40-53, 60-61, 68.
31
AHRA Reference, supra, note 29, at para. 67. See also para. 76: “My colleagues break
new ground in enlarging the judiciary’s role in assessing valid criminal objectives. It is ground on
which I respectfully decline to tread.”
32
Id., at para. 68. See also para. 77.
33
Id., at para. 239.
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In contrast to the common front the Court was able to present in the
previous decade, the 2010 federalism rulings, in conjunction with the
2009 ruling in Fastfrate, have revealed a sharply divided Court. The
Court has an apparently “centralist” bloc led by McLachlin C.J.C.,
Binnie J. and Fish J., and an apparently “decentralist” bloc led by
Deschamps and LeBel JJ. In the Court’s five most significant recent
federalism rulings (Fastfrate, Moses, Lacombe, COPA and the AHRA
Reference), the centralist bloc consistently took the position that favoured
federal power, and the decentralist bloc, with the exception of LeBel J.’s
concurrence based on the paramountcy doctrine in Lacombe, consistently
took the position that favoured provincial power. In seeking to understand these divisions and tendencies, and in considering the relative
merits of the competing positions taken by the judges, we should not
begin, as Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens urges in this volume, with
an a priori commitment to either centralization or decentralization, “as if
decentralization or centralization were abstractly valuable for their own
sake”.34 Nor should we attribute to judges such a priori commitments,
although their normative visions of the relative merits of centralization
vs. decentralization in particular contexts will inevitably inform their
commitment to constitutional interpretation. “Absolute neutrality”, as
Gaudreault-DesBiens notes, “is illusory in such matters”.35 Nevertheless,
we should seek to avoid “ideological determinism”36 and assess judicial
decisions by reference to their fidelity to constitutional understandings of
the federal principle itself.
Why did the divisions on the Court emerge so starkly and suddenly
in the past year? Arguably it was inevitable when one considers the
general trends in the Court’s federalism jurisprudence and the nature of
the issues presented by the cases described above — and indeed the
nature of the issues it will be addressing in the Securities Reference37
34
Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens, “The ‘Principle of Federalism’ and the Legacy of
the Patriation and Quebec Veto References” in J. Cameron & B. Ryder, eds. (2011) 54 S.C.L.R. (2d)
77, at 79 [hereinafter “Gaudreault-DesBiens 2011”]. See also Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens,
“The Irreducible Federal Necessity of Jurisdictional Autonomy, and the Irreducibility of Federalism
to Jurisdictional Autonomy”, in Sujit Choudhry, Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens & Lorne
Sossin, eds., Dilemmas of Solidarity: Redistribution in the Canadian Federation (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2006) 185.
35
Gaudreault-DesBiens 2011, id.
36
Id., at 115 n. 139.
37
In the Matter of a Reference by Governor in Council concerning the proposed Canadian
Securities Act, as set out in Order in Council, P.C. 2010-667, [2010] S.C.C.A. No. 190 (S.C.C.).

(2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d) EQUAL AUTONOMY IN CANADIAN FEDERALISM

573

(heard and reserved on April 13 and 14, 2011) and did address in the
recent decision in PHS Community Services.38
The recent cases land on terrain that exposes two features of the doctrinal structure of the Court’s division of powers jurisprudence that pose
basic threats to the federal principle. The first is the interjurisdictional
immunity doctrine, the problematic features of which LeBel and Binnie
JJ. exposed and critiqued at length in Canadian Western Bank.39 The
second is the use of the pith and substance doctrine, the ancillary powers
doctrine, the double aspect doctrine and the living tree doctrine to extend
the scope of areas subject to de facto concurrent jurisdiction.

II. THE NEED TO MEASURE THE JURISPRUDENCE
AGAINST THE FEDERAL PRINCIPLE
Federalism is one of the five foundational principles of the Canadian
Constitution that have been identified by the Supreme Court of Canada.40
It “dictate[s] major elements of the architecture of the Constitution itself”
and is part of “its lifeblood”.41 The Court has accorded federalism and
the other fundamental constitutional principles special interpretive
significance. Not only do they assist in the interpretation of the constitutional text,42 they can also be used to fill gaps in the express terms of the
Constitution.43 Given the superordinate normative status accorded to the
restricted number of fundamental, structural constitutional principles, we
should measure not just the text, but also the accumulated body of
judicial interpretation of the text against the demands of those principles.
When the judiciary uses fundamental constitutional principles to fill the
38
PHS Community Services Society v. Canada (Attorney General), [2010] B.C.J. No. 57,
2010 BCCA 15 (B.C.C.A.), affd [2011] S.C.J. No. 44, 2011 SCC 44 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Insite”].
39
Supra, note 2, at paras. 35-47.
40
Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Court of Prince Edward Island; Reference re
Independence and Impartiality of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island; R. v.
Campbell; R. v. Ekmecic; R. v. Wickman; Manitoba Provincial Judges Assn. v. Manitoba (Minister
of Justice), [1997] S.C.J. No. 75, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Provincial Judges
Reference”]; Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Secession Reference”].
41
Secession Reference, id., at para. 51.
42
Id., at para. 52.
43
Id., at para. 53. As Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens demonstrates in his contribution
to this volume, the Court has not always defined the federal principle clearly or accorded it
consistent interpretive weight in its constitutional jurisprudence: see Gaudreault-DesBiens 2011,
supra, note 34.
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gaps in the constitutional text, it is engaged in a task that raises profound
questions of democratic legitimacy: normally, gaps in the text of the
supreme law should be filled through democratically accountable constitutional amendment procedures rather than by the judges expanding the
sphere of constitutional supremacy without a clear mandate to do so.44
In contrast, the need to measure the rules and principles developed
by the courts when interpreting the constitutional text against the
evolving understandings of the demands of fundamental constitutional
principles, and to adjust the jurisprudence to align with those fundamental principles when departures from them are detected, are common and
generally accepted features of Canadian constitutional scholarship, legal
argument and judicial practice. This paper seeks to contribute to this
tradition by arguing that several doctrinal features of Canadian constitutional jurisprudence are at odds with the superordinate normative
significance the Court has accorded to the principle of federalism and are
therefore in need of judicial revision to achieve better alignment or
coherence in the jurisprudence as a whole, and, more importantly, to
better safeguard the basic objectives of our constitutional design.

III. THE FEDERAL PRINCIPLE AND EQUAL AUTONOMY
According to the federal principle, federal and provincial governments are coordinate (or equal in status) and autonomous within their
respective spheres of jurisdiction.45 Thus, judicial interpretation of the
division of powers that is faithful to the federal principle will give equal
weight and consideration to the respective claims of provincial legislatures and the federal Parliament when they seek to exercise their autonomy to pursue distinct policy objectives within their respective spheres
of guaranteed and exclusive legislative jurisdiction. In other words,
implicit in the federal principle is the principle of equal autonomy.

44
See Jean Leclair, “Canada’s Unfathomable Constitutional Principles” (2002) 27 Queen’s
L.J. 389; Jamie Cameron, “The Written Word and the Constitution’s Vital Unstated Assumptions”,
in Pierre Thibault, Benoit Pelletier & Louis Perret, eds., Essays in Honour of Gérald A. Beaudoin
(Yvon Blais, 2002), at 89. See also the dissent of La Forest J. in the Provincial Judges Reference,
supra, note 40, at paras. 314-319.
45
This is a widely accepted definition. See, e.g., Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada
(Toronto: Carswell, looseleaf), c. 5.1(a) [hereinafter “Hogg”], quoting Kenneth Clinton Wheare,
Federal Government, 4th ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), at 10 [hereinafter
“Wheare”].
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This principle of equal autonomy is apparent in many features of
Canadian federalism jurisprudence. For example, the principle of equal
autonomy generates a symmetrical application of basic principles of
interpretation (such as the living tree, pith and substance, double aspect
and ancillary powers doctrines)46 to both federal and provincial heads of
powers. These principles give generous, flexible and dynamic scope to
federal and provincial powers alike.47 The principle of equal autonomy is
reflected in the courts’ long-standing rejection of a hierarchical conception of federalism, one that would accord superior status or significance
to federal as compared to provincial powers, or vice versa.48 Instead,
when interpreting the division of powers, the courts conceive of Parliament and the provincial legislatures as being in a coordinate or horizontal
relationship. They are equal in status; neither is subordinate to the
other.49
Consider, for example, the carefully constructed symmetry of Lord
Sankey’s famous dictum in the “Persons” case that the Constitution Act,
1867 (as it is now known) should be given “a large and liberal interpretation so that the Dominion to a great extent, but within certain fixed
limits, may be mistress in her own house, as the Provinces to a great

46
Whether the courts’ commitment, in theory, to applying these doctrines symmetrically to
federal and provincial powers is reflected in practice is open to debate that should be informed by
sustained examinations of the pattern of results in the case law. Justice Deschamps, for one, is not
convinced: in Lacombe, supra, note 24, at para. 104, she stated that “in practice” the ancillary
powers doctrine has “tended to benefit mainly the central government, and to such an extent that it
has upset the balance of Canadian federalism” (citing Henri Brun, Guy Tremblay & Eugénie
Brouillet, Droit constitutionnel, 5th ed. (Cowansville, QC: Éditions Yvon Blais, 2008), at 452-54).
47
See Ryder, supra, note 4.
48
One of the best-known formulations is Lord Watson’s in Maritime Bank of Canada
(Liquidators of) v. New Brunswick (Receiver-General), [1892] J.C.J. No. 1, [1892] A.C. 437, at 441
(P.C.):
The object of the Act was neither to weld the provinces into one, nor to subordinate provincial governments to a central authority, but to create a federal government in which they
should all be represented, entrusted with the exclusive administration of affairs in which
they had a common interest, each province retaining its independence and autonomy.
49
This conception of Canadian federalism is imperfectly embodied in the constitutional
text, which contains a number of important features (such as the declaratory, disallowance and
reservation powers) that are inconsistent with the federal principle. These features led K.C. Wheare
to describe the Canadian Constitution as “quasi-federal”: Wheare, supra, note 45, at 19. However,
other elements of the constitutional text are faithful to the federal principle as equal autonomy, and,
more importantly, Canadian political practice has evolved in a strongly federalist direction, calling
into question the continued legitimacy of the quasi-federal elements of the constitutional text. See
Hogg, supra, note 45, at c. 5.3.
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extent, but within certain fixed limits, are mistresses in theirs”.50 Consistent with the identity of language Lord Sankey used to describe federal
and provincial jurisdiction, the courts aim to give equal weight and
consideration to federal and provincial claims to autonomy.
The courts’ frequent references to the need to preserve “balance” in
the division of powers are likewise a reflection of their concern to protect
and promote the federal principle understood as the protection and
promotion of equal autonomy.51 For example, in the 1993 Ontario
Hydro52 ruling, Iacobucci J., in his dissenting opinion for three members
of the Court, concluded that the federal declaratory power in section
92(10)(c) of the Constitution Act, 1867, which enables the federal
Parliament to enact legislation unilaterally lifting local works out of
provincial and into federal jurisdiction, should be interpreted narrowly in
light of its conflict with modern conceptions of federalism. The principle
of equal autonomy inherent in the federal principle animated his opinion.
As he put it:
[A narrow approach to the declaratory power is] consistent with the
traditional approach to division of powers questions which has been
one of balancing federal and provincial powers through the application
of doctrines such as mutual modification, double aspect and pith and
substance. The Constitution Act, 1867 set up a federalist system of
government for Canada and should be interpreted so as not to allow the
powers of either Parliament or the provincial legislatures to subsume
the powers of the other.53

50

136 (P.C.).

Reference re British North America Act, 1867, [1929] J.C.J. No. 2, [1930] A.C. 124, at

51
For example, in General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City National Leasing Ltd., [1989]
S.C.J. No. 28, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641 (S.C.C.), Dickson C.J.C. repeatedly invoked the need to maintain
balance when interpreting federal and provincial powers in relation to the regulation of trade. He
emphasized the need “to maintain a delicate balance between federal and provincial power” (at para. 32)
and noted that “[b]oth provincial and federal governments have equal ability to legislate in ways that may
incidentally affect the other government’s sphere of power” (at para. 45). Concerns about preserving
balance in the division of powers have likewise figured prominently in many of the major rulings on the
federal division of legislative powers: for notable examples, see the opinion of Beetz J. in Reference re
Anti-Inflation Act (Can.), [1976] S.C.J. No. 12, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373 (S.C.C.), as well as the opinions in R.
v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., [1988] S.C.J. No. 23, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401 (S.C.C.); R. v. HydroQuébec, [1997] S.C.J. No. 76, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213 (S.C.C.); and AHRA Reference, supra, note 29. See
also Fastfrate, supra, note 9, per Rothstein J., at para. 30: “Federalism exists as a fine balance between
local governance and centralized decision making.”
52
Ontario Hydro v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), [1993] S.C.J. No. 99, [1993] 3
S.C.R. 327 (S.C.C.).
53
Id., at para. 138.
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Justice La Forest’s opinion, also for three members of the Court, disagreed with Iacobucci J.’s use of the federal principle to restrict a federal
power, like the declaratory power, that is explicitly conferred by the
constitutional text and that reflects a hierarchical or colonial conception
of federalism (he noted that the disallowance and reservation powers are
other examples of powers inconsistent with contemporary understandings of federalism as equal autonomy). Notwithstanding the judges’
disagreement regarding exceptional unilateral powers like the declaratory
power, La Forest J. outlined common ground with the majority when he
asserted that
[generally courts] have an important, indeed essential, role in balancing
federalism as they go about their task of defining the nature and effect
of those great but more subtle powers, not susceptible of definition and
direction by those elemental political forces that undergird Canadian
federalism.54

Despite the courts’ emphasis on balance and a symmetrically generous approach to the interpretation of federal and provincial powers, some
of the doctrinal features of Canadian federalism jurisprudence are in
tension with the modern conception of federalism founded on equal
respect for the autonomy of federal and provincial legislative bodies. The
paramountcy doctrine, for example, holds that in the case of conflicts
between valid federal and provincial laws, the federal law will prevail by
rendering the provincial law inoperative to the extent of the inconsistency. Insofar as the catalogues of legislative powers in sections 91 and
92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 are concerned, this rule is a product of
judicial interpretation, as these constitutional provisions are silent on
how to resolve conflicts between overlapping exercises of federal and
provincial legislative powers. The equal autonomy principle would not
give primacy as a general rule to either federal or provincial legislation,
as to do so is to accord greater weight to the autonomy of one level of
government. Instead, the equal autonomy principle might give primacy
to federal jurisdiction in some contexts and to provincial jurisdiction in
others, depending on the relative importance of the national or provincial
interests at stake. Or, it might give primacy, on a case-by-case basis, to
whichever law is most closely connected to the constitutional role and
policy objectives of the enacting legislature. However, a strong argument
54

Id., at para. 73.
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can be made that practical considerations related to predictability and
promoting compliance with the rule of law require us to choose between
a general rule of federal paramountcy or a general rule of provincial
paramountcy. And, if we are so forced to choose, the interests of the
whole will generally be greater than the interests of a part; hence the
common adoption of a rule of federal paramountcy in federations. For
this reason, in the context of the paramountcy rule, concerns in Canada
about equal autonomy are most often expressed not as a frontal attack on
the judicially created rule that gives primacy to federal legislation in
cases of conflict, but as a demand that the rule be given a narrow scope
to avoid unduly limiting provincial autonomy.55
While previously the Court had limited the paramountcy doctrine to
situations where it was impossible to comply with overlapping federal
and provincial laws, the Court has expanded the occasions on which the
doctrine will be invoked to include situations where provincial laws are
incompatible with federal legislative purposes.56 A valid provincial law
will be rendered inoperative, therefore, even if it is possible to comply
with it without violating federal law, and even if the provincial law
expresses an important local concern vital to a matter within the province’s constitutionally guaranteed exclusive areas of jurisdiction, so long
as the provincial law frustrates a federal legislative purpose, no matter
how trivial. The result of this expansion of the occasions on which the
federal paramountcy rule can be invoked is that the exercise of provincial
autonomy in areas of shared jurisdiction is rendered dependent upon the
will of the federal Parliament. If one of Parliament’s policy objectives is
to oust provincial legislation entirely from an area of shared jurisdiction,
then apparently all it has to do is say so.57
55
See, e.g., Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon, [1982] S.C.J. No. 66, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161
(S.C.C.), per Dickson J. (as he then was), at 188, quoting Professor Hogg:
The argument that it is untidy, wasteful and confusing to have two laws when only one is
needed reflects a value which in a federal system often has to be subordinated to that of
provincial autonomy.
See also Lacombe, supra, note 24, at para. 119, per Deschamps J.:
The unwritten constitutional principle of federalism and its underlying principles of
co-operative federalism and subsidiarity favour a strict definition of the concept of conflict. The decision to limit the scope of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity must
mean that there is more room to apply the rules of governments at both levels, but the
achievement of this objective can easily be compromised by a lax or vague definition of
the concept of conflict.
56
See, e.g., Rothmans, supra, note 2, at paras. 11-14.
57
See the discussion in Ryder, supra, note 4, at 369-77.
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Because the federal paramountcy rule appears to be premised on a
general rule that it is of greater importance to uphold the operation of
valid federal legislation than it is to uphold the operation of valid
provincial legislation, the rule does not obviously square with the federal
principle or its corollary, the principle of equal autonomy. Since that
departure can be justified by reference to other important values, along
the lines briefly sketched above, and because the paramountcy rule did
not figure prominently in the 2010 rulings that are the focus of this
volume, we will leave further exploration of the paramountcy doctrine
per se to another occasion. But let us not lose sight here of the significance of the judicial adoption of a rule of federal paramountcy when it
operates in conjunction with other features of Canadian federalism
jurisprudence. In particular, when coupled with the trend towards
expansion of areas subject to de facto concurrent power that results from
the liberal deployment of the living tree, pith and substance, double
aspect and ancillary powers doctrines, the rule of federal paramountcy
poses a serious threat to provincial autonomy. We will return to this
significant concern below. Before, though, let us turn to a consideration
of another doctrinal feature of Canadian federalism that is seriously at
odds with the federal principle: the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine.

IV. EQUAL AUTONOMY AND THE INTERJURISDICTIONAL
IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
The interjurisdictional immunity doctrine holds that provincial laws
that are in pith and substance in relation to matters within exclusive
provincial jurisdiction, and therefore valid, must nevertheless be read
down, or restricted in their application, to the extent necessary to prevent
them from impairing matters at the core of federal heads of power. The
doctrine is premised on a strong interpretation of the meaning of “exclusivity” — as a bubble of immunity from impairment — at least insofar as
the core of federal heads of power is concerned.
The federal and provincial heads of power in sections 91 and 92 of
the Constitution Act, 1867 are both described in the text as “exclusive”.
Most of the time, the courts employ the pith and substance, double aspect
and ancillary powers doctrine to interpret the meaning of exclusivity in a
weaker manner: exclusivity means the exclusive ability to pass laws that
deal predominantly with a subject matter allocated to the enacting
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legislature’s jurisdiction. According to the pith and substance doctrine, so
long as the dominant or most important characteristic of a law falls
within a class of subjects allocated to the jurisdiction of the enacting
legislature, the law will be held to be intra vires, even if it has spillover,
or incidental effects, in areas outside of its jurisdiction.58 Overlap and
interplay between federal and provincial laws is to be expected and
welcomed in a modern federal state. The Court has characterized this
approach as the “dominant tide” of constitutional interpretation.59 The
Court takes this dominant, liberal approach to the pith and substance
doctrine, one that is tolerant of spillover effects on the other level of
government’s exclusive legislative jurisdiction, when assessing the
constitutional validity of either federal or provincial laws.60
The interjurisdictional immunity doctrine, on the other hand, is
premised on a stronger understanding of exclusivity, one that does not
tolerate any spillover effects if they would have the effect of impairing a
matter at the core of the other level of government’s legislative powers.61
In contrast to the pith and substance, double aspect and ancillary powers
doctrines, which lean in the direction of expansive interpretations of
federal and provincial legislative powers alike, the interjurisdictional
immunity doctrine operates only in favour of federal heads of power. If
Parliament’s legislative powers set out in section 91 are truly exclusive,
the reasoning goes, they cannot be impaired at their core by provincial
legislation. This is so even if the federal power remains unexercised,
because the doctrine protects the strong sense of exclusivity at the core of
the power, not the manner of its exercise.62 As Beetz J. explained in his
defence of the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine in Bell Canada
(1988),63 if a “power is exclusive, it is because the Constitution, which

58
See Bruce Ryder, “The Demise and Rise of the Classical Paradigm in Canadian Federalism: Promoting Autonomy for the Provinces and First Nations” (1991) 36 McGill L.J. 308, at 325
[hereinafter “Ryder, ‘Demise and Rise’”] (describing this approach to exclusivity and its implications as the “modern paradigm”).
59
O.P.S.E.U. v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1987] S.C.J. S.C.J. No. 48, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 2,
at 17 (S.C.C.); Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 2, at paras. 35-37.
60
See, e.g., the case discussed in Ryder, supra, note 4.
61
Id., at 322, describing this approach to exclusivity and its implications as the “classical
paradigm”.
62
Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 2, at para. 34.
63
Bell Canada v. Québec (Commission de santé et de la sécurité du travail du Québec),
[1988] S.C.J. No. 41, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 749 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter, “Bell Canada 1988”].
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could have been different but is not, expressly specifies this to be the
case”.64
A glaring omission in Beetz J.’s reasoning is his failure to grapple
with the fact that provincial heads of power in section 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 are, like the section 91 heads of power, described as
“exclusive” in the text. The Constitution could have been different, but it
is not. The federal principle and its corollary, the equal autonomy
principle, combined with Beetz J.’s reasoning, leads to the conclusion
that the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine should be employed in a
reciprocal or symmetrical fashion: valid federal legislation must be read
down so as not to impair matters at the core of provincial jurisdiction.
Yet the doctrine has never been applied to protect the core of provincial
heads of power from federal impairment. It has operated in a decidedly
one-way fashion to protect only federal heads of power from provincial
impairment. As Binnie and LeBel JJ. acknowledged in Canadian Western
Bank:
In theory, the doctrine is reciprocal: it applies both to protect provincial
heads of power and provincially regulated undertakings from federal
encroachment, and to protect federal heads of power and federally
regulated undertakings from provincial encroachment. However, it
would appear that the jurisprudential application of the doctrine has
produced somewhat “asymmetrical” results. Its application to federal
laws in order to avoid encroachment on provincial legislative authority
has often consisted of “reading down” the federal enactment or federal
power without too much doctrinal discussion, e.g., Attorney General of
Canada v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 307,
Dominion Stores Ltd. v. The Queen, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 844, and Labatt
Breweries of Canada Ltd. v. Attorney General of Canada, [1980] 1
S.C.R. 914. In general, though, the doctrine has been invoked in favour
of federal immunity at the expense of provincial legislation: Hogg, at
p. 15-34.65

The suggestion that the doctrine has produced “somewhat” asymmetrical results is a gross understatement. It has served only to place limits
on the application of valid provincial laws, and it has done so in a wide
range of significant contexts. I am not aware of any Supreme Court or
64
Id., at para. 251. The weaknesses of Beetz J.’s position have been thoroughly explored in
Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 2, at paras. 42-47, per Binnie and LeBel JJ. See also Ryder,
“Demise and Rise”, supra, note 58, at 351-52 and 356-58.
65
Canadian Western Bank, id., at para. 35.
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other appellate level ruling (apart from the ruling of the B.C. Court of
Appeal recently reversed on this point by the Supreme Court)66 that has
cited the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine, or discussed cores of
provincial heads of power that are immune from federal impairment, as a
reason to restrict the application of valid federal statutes. To say, as
Binnie and LeBel JJ. did in the above quoted passage, that there was not
“too much doctrinal discussion” in the three cases they cite as examples
of instances where federal laws were read down similarly depicts the
situation too mildly. There was no discussion of the interjurisdictional
immunity doctrine in those cases. Nor was there any discussion of the
appropriateness of using “reading down” as a remedy to limit the
encroachment of federal statutes on areas of exclusive provincial
jurisdiction.
Let us briefly examine the three cases cited by Binnie and LeBel JJ.
in support of what they see as some traces of reciprocity or symmetry in
the Court’s approach to exclusivity, and thus of at least some consistency
in this area of the Court’s jurisprudence with the federal principle as
equal autonomy.
First, in Canada (Attorney General) v. Law Society of British Columbia (commonly known as the Jabour case),67 at issue was whether the
federal Combines Investigation Act68 could apply to disciplinary proceedings initiated by the Law Society of British Columbia against a lawyer,
Donald Jabour, who had advertised his practice contrary to the Law
Society’s rules at the time. Justice Estey, writing for the Court, rejected
the argument made by counsel for the appellant (who was, coincidentally, the future Binnie J.) that the federal statute applied to the provincial
proceedings. Justice Estey reached this conclusion as a matter of statutory interpretation. He wrote that
[w]hen a federal statute can be properly interpreted so as not to
interfere with a provincial statute, such an interpretation is to be applied
in preference to another applicable construction which would bring
about a conflict between the two statutes.69

For that reason, he concluded that the challenged provision of the federal
Act “does not apply to the Law Society in the circumstances of this
66
67
68
69

Supra, note 38.
[1982] S.C.J. No. 70, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 307 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Jabour”].
R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23.
Supra, note 67, at 356.
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appeal”70 and, as a result, it was not necessary to answer the question
regarding the constitutional validity of the statute.71
In the second case cited by Binnie and LeBel JJ., Dominion Stores,72
at issue was whether a grocery store could be convicted for using a grade
name (“Canada Extra Fancy”) without complying with the stipulations
set out in federal legislation. Writing for the majority opinion in a 5-4
ruling, Estey J. found the statute invalid as an invasion of provincial
jurisdiction in relation to intra-provincial trade. He thus acquitted
Dominion Stores, for reasons he summarized in the following passage:
It is not necessary to determine, in my view, whether Part I [of the
challenged legislation] is ultra vires the Parliament of Canada in toto
and we are not invited by the appellant to do so. It is sufficient if it is
found to be inapplicable to the events as alleged in the charge laid
against the appellant under the federal statute. It may be that Part I has
at least a partial validity in that the grading program of s. 3 is
integrated with the international and interprovincial trade program
which is the subject of Part II of the statute, but in my view, s. 3 has
no validity in relation to purely intraprovincial transactions and in that
respect is ultra vires.73

In his dissent in Dominion Stores, Laskin C.J.C. would have upheld
the validity of the federal legislation, and its application to the intraprovincial transactions at issue, as a logical extension of Parliament’s
jurisdiction over interprovincial and international trade. The majority and
70

Id., at 359.
Id., at 362. Robin Elliot argues that the Jabour ruling “bears a very close resemblance to”
interjurisdictional immunity cases. See Robin Elliot, “Constitutional Law — Division of Powers —
Interjurisdictional Immunity, Reading Down and Pith and Substance: Ontario Public Service
Employees Union v. Attorney-General for Ontario” (1988) 67 Can. Bar Rev. 523, at 542 [hereinafter
“Elliot 1988”]. See also Robin Elliot, “Interjurisdictional Immunity after Canadian Western Bank
and Lafarge Canada Inc.: The Supreme Court Muddies the Doctrinal Waters — Again” (2008) 43
S.C.L.R. (2d) 433, at 473, n. 175 [hereinafter “Elliot 2008”]. With respect, any resemblance of the
reasoning in Jabour to existing interjurisdictional immunity doctrine is difficult to discern.
72
R. v. Dominion Stores Ltd., [1979] S.C.J. 131, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 844 (S.C.C.).
73
Id., at 865-66. Robin Elliot cites the quoted passage as evidence that the Dominion Stores
ruling bears a close resemblance to interjurisdictional immunity cases that found provincial statutes
to be inapplicable to core elements of federal legislative powers: Elliot 1988, supra, note 71, at 542,
n. 72 and accompanying text. With respect, the use by Estey J. of the word “inapplicable” in
tailoring a minimalist remedy sufficient to meet the appellant’s interest in escaping prosecution does
not transform a case about validity into a case about restricting the application of otherwise valid
statutes. More recently, Professor Elliot has acknowledged that Dominion Stores is a case about
validity and “therefore should not have been cited” by Binnie and LeBel JJ. in Canadian Western
Bank as an example of “reading down” otherwise valid federal statutes to protect exclusive
provincial jurisdiction. See Elliot 2008, supra, note 71, at 473, n. 175.
71
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dissenting opinions thus disagreed about the validity of the challenged
federal legislation.
Finally, in Labatt,74 at issue was whether Parliament had jurisdiction
to enact legislation establishing compositional standards for foods and
beverages. The majority opinion of Estey J. found the challenged
provisions of the Food and Drugs Act invalid. Parliament did not have
jurisdiction to adopt detailed “legal recipes”75 regulating a single trade or
industry. The dissenting opinions would have upheld the challenged
provisions as a valid exercise of the federal trade and commerce power.
Thus, as in the Court’s ruling in Dominion Stores, the disagreement
between the majority and the dissenting opinions in Labatt related to the
validity of the challenged legislation.76
In summary, the three cases cited by Binnie and LeBel JJ. do not
provide support for the proposition that federal laws have been read
down to avoid encroachment on provincial legislative authority. None of
the opinions in Jabour, Dominion Stores or Labatt made any mention of
using constitutional principles to limit the applicability of otherwise valid
federal legislation, or of the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine, or of
using the reading down remedy to protect a core of provincial jurisdiction from impairment by a valid federal statute. Rather, one of these
cases used statutory interpretation principles to read down a federal
statute to avoid a conflict with provincial legislation (Jabour) and the
other two found federal legislation invalid as an invasion of provincial
jurisdiction in relation to intra-provincial trade (Labatt and Dominion
Stores). Thus, one must look elsewhere for evidence of symmetry or
reciprocity in the courts’ use of the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine,
or of related reasoning restricting the application of federal statutes to
prevent encroachments on matters assigned by the Constitution to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the provinces.
In fairness to Binnie and LeBel JJ., the results in Jabour, Dominion
Stores and Labatt provide evidence of the fact that the courts have legal
tools at their disposal that can be used to protect exclusive provincial
legislative powers from encroachment by federal legislation, even if they
74
Labatt Breweries of Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1979] S.C.J. No. 134,
[1980] 1 S.C.R. 914 (S.C.C.).
75
Id., at 943.
76
Robin Elliot agrees that the Labatt ruling was based on a finding of invalidity rather than
a finding of restricted applicability of an otherwise valid federal statute. See Elliot 2008, supra, note
71, at 473, n. 175.
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eschew any reliance on, or mention of, concepts of constitutional
inapplicability or interjurisdictional immunity to accomplish that
objective. Nevertheless, these same tools are also available to protect
exclusive federal legislative powers from encroachment by provincial
legislation. The problem remains that another powerful tool frequently
resorted to by the courts, namely the interjurisdictional immunity
doctrine, is used only to protect the exclusivity of federal powers in a
strong sense. Treating provincial legislative powers as less exclusive is
not consistent with the federal principle or its corollary, the principle of
equal autonomy.
Like Binnie and LeBel JJ., Robin Elliot is of the view that some case
law supports “reading down” federal legislation to protect the exclusivity
of provincial jurisdiction, even if those cases do not use the language of
interjurisdictional immunity per se. In several articles that undertake a
careful and detailed review of the case law,77 Elliot defends the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine from its critics, essentially agreeing
with Beetz J. that the doctrine is necessary to give meaning to the
exclusivity of constitutional powers. Unlike Beetz J., and like Binnie and
LeBel JJ., Elliot acknowledges that the federal principle requires that the
doctrine operate in a reciprocal or symmetrical manner to protect the
core of both federal and provincial powers from impairment. Thus, he
applauds “the reaffirmation of the doctrine’s legitimacy” in Canadian
Western Bank and “the recognition that, as a matter of principle, the
doctrine should operate to protect core areas of provincial as well as
federal jurisdiction”.78
In his account of the cases and the jurisprudence, Elliot strains to
minimize the doctrine’s incompatibility, in theory and practice, with the
federal principle. Like Binnie and LeBel JJ., he notes that a number of
cases have employed the reading down remedy to limit the application of
federal statutes to prevent encroachment on exclusive provincial jurisdiction.79 Even if these cases do not refer to the interjurisdictional immunity
doctrine, he argues, the effect is the same.80 The problem is that the
number and significance of the cases that Elliot cites in support of the
77
78
79
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Elliot 1988, supra, note 71; Elliot 2008, supra, note 71.
Elliot 2008, id., at 481.
Elliot 1988, supra, note 71, at notes 70-75 and accompanying text; Elliot 2008, id., at
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reciprocal invocation of the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine (or
equivalent lines of reasoning) to restrict the application of valid federal
statutes is slim indeed. In his 1988 article, he cites only a handful of
cases,81 two of which, Jabour and Dominion Stores, as discussed above,
do not read down federal statutes to protect the exclusivity of provincial
areas of jurisdiction. Twenty years later, in a 2008 article, Elliot was able
to provide two additional examples:
One is Clark v. Canadian National Railway Co., in which the Court
interpreted a limitation period in the federal Railway Act to be
applicable only to civil causes of action created by the Act itself in
order to protect from federal incursion what the Court saw as exclusive
provincial jurisdiction over the barring of common law tort actions.
And more recently, in Isen v. Simms, the Court read down a provision
of the Canada Shipping Act that limited the quantum of damage awards
in tort actions involving ships in order to protect what it saw as
exclusive provincial jurisdiction over liability in such actions.82

Elliot’s excavation of the case law helps provide some building
blocks on which the courts can build to make the interjurisdictional
immunity doctrine operate in a truly reciprocal manner consistent with
the federal principle. The Clark case in particular is a better example,
compared to those cited by Binnie and LeBel JJ. in Canadian Western
Bank, of the use of the language of applicability and reading down to
protect exclusive provincial powers from federal invasion.
Still, one cannot help but be struck by the paltry sum and significance of the examples provided by Elliot, especially when contrasted
with the much larger number of cases explicitly invoking the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine to restrict the application of otherwise valid
provincial statutes in a wide range of significant contexts.83 The fact
remains that the courts have developed a significant body of jurisprudence defining core elements of federal heads of power and restricting
the application of otherwise valid provincial laws to prevent impairment
of those core matters. The courts have simply not engaged in the tasks of
defining core elements of provincial heads of power and restricting the
application of otherwise valid federal laws to prevent impairment of
81
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those core matters. Indeed, on a number of occasions, when expressly
invited to invoke the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine in a reciprocal
manner to protect exclusive heads of provincial power from federal
encroachment, the Supreme Court has refused to do so.84
In light of the courts’ consistently one-sided invocation of the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine, it would more accurately reflect
judicial practice if it were renamed the “doctrine of greater federal
exclusivity”.85 We should not shirk from this reality or mince words
about it. From the perspective of the federal principle, the one-sided
invocation of the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine is a significant
problem that needs to be confronted openly and honestly. The doctrine,
in judicial practice, by treating federal powers as being more strongly
exclusive than provincial powers, runs blatantly counter to the federal
principle (and its corollary, the principle of equal autonomy), an underlying principle of the Constitution that the Court has granted superordinate
interpretive importance.
The Court could bring the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine into
line with the federal principle in one of two ways. First, it could abandon
the doctrine altogether, given that it runs counter to the “dominant tide”
of the modern flexible approach to federalism promoted by other
constitutional doctrines. Second, it could commit itself to invoking the
doctrine reciprocally to protect the core of provincial heads of power
from being impaired by the application of valid federal laws. Either of
these options would involve significant departures from settled jurisprudence, giving rise to the usual concerns about the creation of uncertainty
and the disruption of expectations and arrangements built up in reliance
upon the existing state of the law.86
The joint opinion of Binnie and LeBel JJ. in Canadian Western Bank
did not embrace either of these drastic options for aligning the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine with the federal principle. They favoured an
84

See Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport), [1992]
S.C.J. No. 1, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.); Ontario Hydro v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board),
[1993] S.C.J. No. 99, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 327 (S.C.C.); Alberta Government Telephones v. Canada
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S.C.R. 225 (S.C.C.); Insite, supra, note 38, at paras. 53-70.
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71, at 495.
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See Wade Wright, “Facilitating Intergovernmental Dialogue: Judicial Review of the
Division of Powers in the Supreme Court of Canada” in Jamie Cameron & Bruce Ryder, eds. (2010)
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incremental approach.87 They narrowed the doctrine’s scope by defining
the protected core of federal powers restrictively88 and by requiring
“impairment” of, rather than a mere impact on, a core power.89 They
disfavoured “intensive reliance” on the doctrine.90 They described it as “a
doctrine of limited application”91 or “very restricted scope”.92 In general,
they wrote, the doctrine should
be reserved for situations already covered by precedent. This means, in
practice, that it will be largely reserved for those heads of power that
deal with federal things, persons or undertakings, or where in the past
its application has been considered absolutely indispensable or
necessary to enable Parliament or a provincial legislature to achieve the
purpose for which exclusive legislative jurisdiction was conferred, as
discerned from the constitutional division of powers as a whole, or
what is absolutely indispensable or necessary to enable an undertaking
to carry out its mandate in what makes it specifically of federal (or
provincial) jurisdiction.93

By implying that precedent favours the doctrine’s reciprocal invocation, this passage obscures the contradiction between confining the
doctrine to precedent and ensuring that it applies reciprocally to protect
provincial powers, as demanded by the federal principle. The truth is
that, apart from the ruling of the majority of the British Columbia Court
of Appeal in the Insite case currently on appeal to the Supreme Court,94
the doctrine has never been considered, to use the formulation of Binnie
and LeBel JJ. in Canadian Western Bank quoted above, “absolutely
indispensable or necessary to enable a provincial legislature to achieve
the purpose for which exclusive legislative jurisdiction was conferred”.
With hindsight, we can now imagine that Binnie and LeBel JJ., who
have since emerged in the Court’s more recent federalism rulings as
leaders of the centralist and decentralist blocs respectively, might have
been able to achieve agreement on the text of their joint opinion in
Canadian Western Bank by burying in ambiguities some disagreements
about the pace and direction of needed doctrinal reform. Several recent
87
88
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90
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cases involving the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine have landed
squarely on the uncertain terrain produced by these ambiguities embedded in Canadian Western Bank.
The Lacombe and COPA cases provided the Court with an opportunity to restrict the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine by permitting the
challenged municipal and provincial laws regulating land use to apply to
the location of aerodromes in the province. A number of commentators
on the Canadian Western Bank ruling anticipated that it heralded a more
restricted role for the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine in the
future.95 However, the rulings in Lacombe and COPA leave one wondering whether that will turn out to be the case. The majority opinions of
McLachlin C.J.C. in both cases invoked the doctrine in less than compelling circumstances with surprisingly little hesitation. The spirit of
Canadian Western Bank is not evident in the Chief Justice’s opinions.
In COPA, at issue was whether Quebec’s Act respecting the preservation of agricultural land and agricultural activities96 could restrict the
location of aerodromes authorized by the federal Aeronautics Act.97 All
members of the Court agreed that the provincial Act was valid and that
precedent established that the location of aerodromes is a matter that falls
within the core of Parliament’s exclusive jurisdiction in relation to
aeronautics.98 The issue, then, was whether the application of the Act
would impair federal jurisdiction in relation to aeronautics. The Chief
Justice defined impairment as “a serious or significant intrusion on the
exercise of the federal power”.99 She then found that this test was met
because the application of the Quebec legislation would force Parliament
to enact its own legislation if it wanted to have the final say on the
location of aerodromes:

95
Peter W. Hogg & Rahat Godil, “Narrowing Interjurisdictional Immunity” in Jamie Cameron, Patrick Monahan & Bruce Ryder, eds. (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 623; John G. Furey, “Interjurisdictional Immunity: The Pendulum Has Swung” in id., 597; Elizabeth Edinger, “Back to the Future
with Interjurisdictional Immunity: Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta; British Columbia v. Lafarge
Canada Inc.” (2008) 66 Adv. 553; Carissima Mathen & M. Plaxton, “Developments in Constitutional Law: The 2006-2007 Term” (2007) 38 S.C.L.R. (2d) 111, at 131-36. See also Elliot 2008, supra,
note 71.
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R.S.Q., c. P-41.1.
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R.S.C. 1985, c. A-2, s. 4.9(e).
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COPA, supra, note 24, at paras. 37-40, per McLachlin C.J.C.; Lacombe, supra, note 24,
at para. 154, per Deschamps J.
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Instead of the current permissive regime, Parliament would be obliged
to legislate for the specific location of particular aerodromes. Such a
substantial restriction of Parliament’s legislative freedom constitutes an
impairment of the federal power.100

In Lacombe, the Chief Justice found the by-law prohibiting water
aerodromes on recreational lakes to be invalid as an invasion of exclusive federal jurisdiction in relation to aeronautics. This conclusion
followed a surprisingly tortuous reading of the by-law that disconnected
it from the municipality’s other by-laws dealing with land use, and thus
denied it validity through the ancillary powers doctrine. Even if she had
found the by-law to be valid, she stated that
[it] would be inapplicable to the extent [it prohibited water
aerodromes], under the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. A
prohibition on aerodromes, even as part of a broad class of land uses,
would result in an unacceptable narrowing of Parliament’s legislative
options. As in COPA, this would have the effect of impairing the core
of the federal power over aeronautics.101

Treating a narrowing of Parliament’s legislative options as sufficient
to amount to an impairment of the exercise of its core jurisdiction, thus
requiring the reading down of a valid provincial law, turns the reasoning
in Canadian Western Bank on its head. One of the reasons Binnie and
LeBel JJ. gave for restricting the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine is
that it risks creating undesirable legal vacuums.102 In COPA and Lacombe, the Chief Justice stated that avoiding legal vacuums by permitting valid provincial laws to apply to core federal subject matters is
problematic because it forces Parliament to legislate if it wishes to
overcome or supplement the rules set out in provincial law. In other
words, the Chief Justice would rather risk legal vacuums than risk
interference with Parliament’s legislative agenda.
While the Chief Justice’s opinions in the aerodrome cases are sensitive to the need to respect Parliament’s autonomy, they do not evince the
same sensitivity to why it might be important to enable local citizens to
have a say in the location of aerodromes. Justice Deschamps’ opinions in
Lacombe and COPA, in contrast, emphasized the principle of subsidiarity
as a way of ensuring that provincial claims to exercise their autonomous
100
101
102
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powers are treated with equal respect,103 concluded that the municipal
by-law and provincial statute at issue fell short of impairing Parliament’s
ability to regulate the location of aerodromes,104 and closed with a plea
for the preservation of space for local democratic institutions to express
local concerns:
There is something fundamentally incoherent in the interpretation of
the rules of our federalist system if a municipality is unable to establish
reasonable limits to ensure that uses of its territory are compatible with
one another where no activities falling under the core of a protected
federal power are actually impaired and there is no inconsistency with
federal legislation. Whether in the case of a pilot training school that is
authorized to operate in an urban environment (more than 500 aircraft
movements a day) or in one involving low-level float plane takeoffs
over a public beach, the governments that are closest to citizens and
have jurisdiction over land use planning should have reasonable
latitude to act where the central government fails to do so or proves to
be indifferent.105

The “something fundamentally incoherent” is the failure to accord
equal weight and consideration to the importance of provincial claims to
autonomy, grounded in valid local concerns falling squarely within
exclusive provincial jurisdiction, pursuant to section 92(13), to enact
laws in relation to the use of real property. The majority took the position
that provinces and municipalities must be denied any constitutional
capacity whatsoever to regulate the location of aerodromes through the
valid exercise of their exclusive jurisdiction, because allowing the
provinces to do so would require Parliament to legislate on the matter if
it wishes to assert the primacy of its policy objectives in its area of
exclusive jurisdiction. The provincial exercise of exclusive jurisdiction is
denied so that potential future federal deliberations about whether to
exercise its exclusive jurisdiction can be made in an unoccupied field,
unhindered by any concerns about provincial rules. By according a
remarkable degree of solicitude to the need to protect the exclusivity of
federal jurisdiction in relation to the location of aerodromes, and demonstrating nothing approximating the same degree of concern for protecting
the exclusivity of provincial jurisdiction overlapping with the same
103
104
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subject matter, the majority opinions in Lacombe and COPA are inconsistent with the federal principle and its corollary, the principle of equal
autonomy.
The aerodrome cases were a missed opportunity to close the gap between the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine and the federal principle.
Rather than building on the apparent change of direction signalled in
Canadian Western Bank, and restricting the invocation of the doctrine to
protect federal heads of power, the Chief Justice’s majority opinions
appear to have headed in the opposite direction.
The Court had an opportunity to close the gap between the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine and the federal principle from the other
direction: that is, by invoking it to protect a matter at the core of provincial jurisdiction from impairment through the application of federal law.
In Insite,106 a majority of the British Columbia Court of Appeal held that
the possession and trafficking offences in the federal Controlled Drugs
and Substances Act107 had to be read down, or restricted in their application, to avoid impairing the operation of Insite, a provincially authorized
safe injection site operating in the Downtown Eastside of Vancouver. The
majority opinion of Huddart J.A. picked up on the suggestion in Canadian Western Bank that the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine should
be reciprocal. She noted:
It would be difficult to envisage anything more at the core of a
hospital’s purpose, than the determination of the nature of the services
it provides to the community it serves. Indeed, it would be difficult to
envisage anything more at the core of the province’s general
jurisdiction over health care than decisions about the nature of the
services it will provide …108

Applying the CDSA to Insite’s activities would make it impossible
for the facility to deliver safe injection services, which ought to qualify
as impairment of exclusive provincial jurisdiction in relation to hospitals,
the medical profession and health care. As Huddart J.A. wrote, “[i]f
interjurisdictional immunity is not available to a provincial undertaking
on the facts of this case, then it may well be said the doctrine is not
reciprocal and can never be applied to protect exclusive provincial
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powers.”109 That appeared to be the view of Smith J.A. in her dissent.
Quoting from Canadian Western Bank, she endorsed “a limited application of the doctrine … to circumstances in which previous case law has
already relied on its use.”110
Based on the 2010 rulings, it was difficult to predict which view
would prevail on appeal to the Supreme Court in Insite. Would it be the
novel invocation of interjurisdictional immunity by Huddart J.A. relying
on Canadian Western Bank’s support of reciprocity, at least in theory? Or
would it be Smith J.A.’s refusal to invoke interjurisdictional immunity
based on the restriction of the doctrine to situations already covered by
precedent? One would have expected that Deschamps and LeBel JJ.
would be sympathetic to Huddart J.A.’s approach. In Lacombe,
Deschamps J. expressed the view that “the recognition of new provincial
cores of power” should not be precluded by Canadian Western Bank.111
While McLachlin C.J.C. did not directly address the possibility of the
interjurisdictional immunity doctrine evolving in a reciprocal direction in
the aerodrome cases, she described the doctrine in one-way terms, as
aimed at the preservation of federal core competencies from provincial
impairment.112 Justice Deschamps picked up on this and accused the
Chief Justice of “getting away from both the letter and the spirit of
Canadian Western Bank when she suggests that the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity is limited to the protection of federal powers”.113
The Court ended up siding with Smith J.A., thus continuing its tradition of giving a cold shoulder to provincial attempts to invoke interjurisdictional immunity. In her opinion on behalf of a unanimous Court, the
Chief Justice noted that the proposed invocation of the interjurisdictional
immunity doctrine to protect the exclusivity of the core of provincial
health jurisdiction is not supported by precedent and runs against the
courts’ desire to restrict the doctrine’s operation.114 Moreover, the Chief
Justice wrote, the argument rests on a broad and ill-defined definition of
core health matters and risks creating legal vacuums.115
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The Insite ruling signals that all members of the Court are content to
adhere to the doctrinal status quo, with its yawning gap between the
federal principle and the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine. Not even
LeBel and Deschamps JJ. — perhaps surprisingly given the strength of
their opinions in the 2010 aerodrome cases — were willing to take steps
to close the gap in Insite.

V. EQUAL AUTONOMY AND DE FACTO CONCURRENCY
A second way in which the doctrinal structure of division of powers
jurisprudence poses a threat to the federal principle is through the
substantial growth of de facto areas of concurrent jurisdiction. Large and
liberal interpretations of federal and provincial heads of power, supplemented by the principle of dynamic interpretation (or the “living tree”
principle), expand the possibilities for overlapping jurisdiction. Likewise,
liberal resort to the pith and substance doctrine, the ancillary powers
doctrine and the double aspect doctrine leave ample room for overlap
and interplay between federal and provincial legislation.
While there is much to commend in the Supreme Court’s modern and
flexible approach to federalism from a democratic perspective, it poses a
real danger to the federal principle.116 It is not just a win-win situation.
The reason for this is the rule of federal paramountcy discussed above.117
William Lederman expressed the concern well:
… there is still need to avoid over-extension of the definition of the
scope of federal categories of power if balance is to be maintained in
our constitution. Complete concurrency of federal powers with
provincial ones, coupled with the doctrine of federal paramountcy,
would mean the end of a balanced federal system in Canada. The trend
to increased concurrency then may have its dangers for the autonomy
of the provinces, though so far [writing in the mid-1960s] the main
effect of the trend has been to uphold provincial statutes.118

Because the rule of federal paramountcy renders conflicting provincial
laws inoperative, areas subject to concurrent powers are in fact areas in
116
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which Parliament is ultimately supreme and the provincial legislatures
are subordinate. The provinces have only a conditional autonomy in
areas of de jure or de facto concurrent jurisdiction. Rather than exercising guaranteed, exclusive jurisdiction, they are put in the position of
supplicants to the federal government. To secure legislative space for the
pursuit of distinct policy objectives, the provinces must negotiate with a
national government that is holding the legal trump card — the federal
paramountcy rule — in its hand. If the provincial pursuit of distinct
policies in the growing areas of shared jurisdiction is conditional upon
federal consent or forbearance, the provinces cannot be confident that
their autonomy will be secured in the future.119 For this reason, the
combined effect of the federal paramountcy rule and the growth of areas
of de facto concurrency poses a serious threat to the federal principle and
its corollary, the principle of equal autonomy.
As long as the areas subject to de facto concurrent powers grow
modestly and incrementally, the dangers to the federal principle may not
be considered to be particularly serious, although over time they may
become so. However, when the federal government seeks to persuade the
courts to expand the scope of de facto concurrent jurisdiction more
dramatically, especially in areas that have traditionally fallen within
provincial jurisdiction, this is likely to provoke a defensive judicial
response seeking to preserve balance in the division of powers. This is
precisely what happened in the AHRA Reference when the federal
Parliament sought to assert jurisdiction through the criminal law power,
as Cromwell J. described it, over “virtually every aspect of research and
clinical practice in relation to assisted human reproduction”.120 Given
that the controlled activities provisions of the AHRA would have enabled
federal regulation of virtually all aspects of procedures such as donor
insemination and in vitro fertilization, it is not surprising that Cromwell
J. joined forces with Deschamps and LeBel JJ. to protect provincial
jurisdiction over the regulation of these health services from being
potentially eclipsed by federal paramountcy.
119
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Similarly, the federal government is arguing that the validity of the
proposed Canadian Securities Act, which is currently under consideration by the Supreme Court of Canada, can be upheld as an example of
the flexibility permitted by a broad interpretation of the “general regulation of trade” power and by liberal interpretations of the pith and substance doctrine and the double aspect doctrine.121 Provincial legislative
jurisdiction in relation to securities will not be superseded, the federal
government argues; it will simply be supplemented by concurrent or
overlapping federal jurisdiction. The assertion of such a significant new
area of concurrent federal jurisdiction, where federal laws would become
paramount over any conflicting provincial laws, and long-established
provincial jurisdiction thus would become subordinate, has been resoundingly rejected by the Alberta Court of Appeal (in a 5-0 opinion)122
and the Quebec Court of Appeal (in a 4-1 opinion).123
Is the Supreme Court likely to agree with the appeal courts and find
the proposed national securities legislation ultra vires? It is safe to
predict that LeBel and Deschamps JJ. will not affirm the Act’s validity.
Based on their recent rulings, there is a good chance that the Chief
Justice and Binnie and Fish JJ. will find the proposed Canadian Securities Act valid. Justice Charron has retired and will not participate in the
opinion. In predicting how the remaining three justices (Abella, Cromwell and Rothstein JJ.) will decide, the federal government is no doubt
concerned by the ruling in the AHRA Reference. Justice Cromwell quoted
LeBel and Deschamps JJ. (who were joined by Abella and Rothstein JJ.)
to the effect that “recourse to the criminal law power cannot … be based
solely on concerns for efficiency or consistency, as such concerns,
viewed in isolation, do not fall under the criminal law”.124 While every
head of power has different characteristics, it seems no more likely that
the “general regulation of trade” power will support the assertion of
federal jurisdiction over all aspects of securities regulation in the absence
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of a reason more compelling than the desire for uniformity or efficiency
that seems to underlie the initiative.
Pushing the courts to expand federal jurisdiction into broad new areas traditionally regulated by the provinces, thus creating new areas
subject to de facto concurrent power, is not likely to be a winning
constitutional strategy. The threat to the federal principle, to the balance
of the division of powers, is too palpable.
Advocates of uniform schemes of national regulation in relation to
assisted reproduction or securities need not despair. They may find
comfort in knowing that a tried and true solution exists when Canadian
legislatures seek to endow a single regulator with jurisdiction to address
both provincial and federal aspects of a divided subject matter.125 For
example, divided jurisdiction over trade, a fundamental feature of
Canadian federalism since Parsons,126 can be overcome through a
cooperative scheme of interlocking federal and provincial legislation,
using techniques such as administrative delegation and incorporation by
reference.127 This is precisely the approach that the courts have encouraged and sanctioned in contexts such as the regulation of trucking and
agricultural products marketing.128 For example, in Fédération des
producteurs de volailles du Québec v. Pelland, the Court upheld legislation that conferred jurisdiction over the intra- and extra-provincial
marketing of chickens on a Quebec board. Justice Abella, writing for a
unanimous Court, noted that “[e]ach level of government enacted laws
and regulations, based on their respective legislative competencies, to
create a unified and coherent regulatory scheme.”129 In response to
objections to the scheme, she held that its constitutional validity is
supported by “a venerable chain of judicial precedent”.130
125
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The federal government’s proposed Canadian Securities Act, in contrast, chooses to assert federal jurisdiction over both the intra- and extraprovincial aspects of securities regulation, with no legislative support
from the provinces. The proposed Act does provide, in section 250, that
its key regulatory components will not come into force in a province
without the written consent of the provincial Cabinet. While obtaining
provincial executive consent to what is otherwise unilateral federal
legislative action may be the wise and decent thing to do from a political
perspective, from a constitutional perspective it is a very different beast
from joint legislative action by a provincial legislature and Parliament,
each acting within its protected exclusive sphere of jurisdiction. Executive agreement cannot alter the limits imposed on Parliament and the
provincial legislatures by the constitutional division of powers. In other
words, the proposed Act may be pursuing a kind of co-operative federalism in a political sense, but it chooses a mechanism that is different from
the kinds of co-operative federalism sanctioned, and indeed celebrated,
by the Supreme Court as a matter of constitutional law.
Rather than push the limits of the general regulation of trade power
and strain the federal principle, if the federal government truly wants to
pursue a constitutionally sound, cooperative approach to endowing a
single regulator with jurisdiction over all aspects of securities regulation,
it should follow the “well-established body of precedent upholding the
validity of administrative delegation in aid of cooperative federalism”.131
The facta of the British Columbia Attorney General and the Saskatchewan Attorney General in the federal reference urge just such a course.132
It is also supported by the comments of Justice Michel Robert at the end
of his opinion in Quebec Securities Reference:
The centralized approach advanced by the proposed securities
legislation can be pursued by the governments of this country if they so
desire. Possible avenues include a law passed by Parliament that would
complement provincial laws and that would regulate the interprovincial,
131

Id, at para. 55.
Factum of the Attorney General for Saskatchewan, Canadian Securities Act Reference,
File No. 33718, at paras. 71-77; Factum of the Attorney General of British Columbia, Canadian
Securities Act Reference, File No. 33718, at paras. 90-104. Both facta note that a number of earlier
proposals for a single national securities regulator relied on interlocking federal and provincial
legislation and other constitutionally sound techniques that respect the division of powers. Given the
availability of these valid means of establishing a single national securities regulator, the B.C.
factum closes by noting that finding the proposed Act ultra vires would not be “the end of the
matter; it is simply the beginning”: id., at para. 104.
132
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international and criminal aspects of the trade in securities, an agreement
putting in place a cooperative regime on the matter or a constitutional
amendment.
Conversely, one cannot interpret the jurisprudence regarding s. 91(2)
of the Constitution Act, 1867 in a manner that would support such an
initiative without the agreement of the provinces when their incapacity
to regulate a sector of the economy has not been established. To do
otherwise would be to assault the federal compromise made at the
creation of our country and to threaten, all at the same time, the balance
of powers between the two orders of government, the continued
existence of the civil law of Québec and the existence of diverse
common law approaches to private law in the other provinces and
territories.133

The type of cooperative approach to regulating the entirety of a matter with intra- and extra-provincial dimensions through interlocking
federal and provincial legislation that was endorsed by Abella J. in
Pelland, and by Robert C.J. in the Quebec Securities Reference, could be
pursued likewise by agreement between the federal government and any
provinces that are content to leave regulation of assisted reproduction to
the federal Assisted Human Reproduction Agency. To allow Parliament
to assert jurisdiction over the regulation of all aspects of assisted human
reproduction or all aspects of the trade in securities would not be consistent with contemporary Canadian understandings of the federal principle
and its corollary, the principle of equal autonomy.

133

Supra, note 123, at paras. 228-229. My translation of:
L’approche centralisée que la Proposition avance en matière de réglementation du
commerce des valeurs mobilières peut validement être poursuivie par les gouvernements
de ce pays s’ils le désirent. Les avenues possibles incluent une loi du Parlement qui serait
complémentaire aux lois provinciales et qui réglementerait les aspects interprovinciaux,
internationaux et criminels du commerce des valeurs mobilières, un accord mettant en
place un régime coopératif en la matière ou une modification constitutionnelle.
À l’inverse, on ne saurait interpréter la jurisprudence relative au paragraphe 91(2) de
la Loi constitutionnelle de 1867 de manière à légitimer une telle initiative sans l’accord
des provinces dans des cas où leur incapacité à réglementer un secteur de l’économie n’a
pas été établie. En faire autant porterait atteinte au compromis fédératif à l’origine de la
création de notre pays et menacerait à la fois l’équilibre des pouvoirs entre les deux ordres de gouvernement, la pérennité du droit civil québécois et l’existence d’une common
law de droit privé diversifiée dans les autres provinces et territoires.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Central to Canadian federalism jurisprudence is the principle of according equal weight and consideration to the claims of provincial
legislatures and the federal Parliament when they seek to exercise their
autonomy to pursue distinct policy objectives within their respective
spheres of legislative jurisdiction. I have argued that the apparently
sudden emergence of stark differences of opinion on the Supreme Court
of Canada in recent federalism cases was a predictable result of its
engagement with issues that invoke features of the jurisprudence inconsistent with this principle, namely the asymmetrical interjurisdictional
immunity doctrine and the growth in areas subject to de facto concurrent
power. Unfortunately, in its 2010 rulings in the aerodrome cases (COPA
and Lacombe), and its 2011 ruling in Insite, the Court missed an opportunity to push forward the spirit of Canadian Western Bank and narrow
the gap between the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine and the federal
principle. In the AHRA Reference, a slim majority of the Court rejected
the attempt by the federal government to establish that the regulation of
all aspects of assisted reproductive health services is a double aspect
matter subject to de facto concurrent legislative jurisdiction. The federal
government is likely to face similar difficulties obtaining a positive
opinion from the Court on the validity of the proposed Canadian
Securities Act, although it seems likely that the issue will split the Court
down the middle. As was the case in the AHRA Reference, the outcome
may turn on a single justice’s vote. This would not be a comfortable
result for the Court or the federation. Rather than strain the limits of
federal powers in a manner that threatens the federal principle, if federal
and provincial governments are convinced of the value of a single
national regulator in an area of shared jurisdiction, they would be welladvised to pursue that goal through a constitutionally sound “Plan B”,
namely, the enactment of a cooperative scheme of interlocking federal
and provincial legislation endowing a single regulator with comprehensive jurisdiction.

